'Toch vervolging Wall Street?'

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S.G.I.G. Temple Admin
S.G.I.G. Temple Admin
Berichten: 24854
Lid geworden op: za 21 aug 2010, 16:08

Om te beginnen wil ik even zeggen dat het Metalfyre was die me op dit bericht wees, waardoor ik dacht van: "Hier moeten we toch even wat aandacht aan besteden!" Dus zo gedacht, zo getyped... Om even goed in de sfeer te komen voor dit artikel zetten we eerst even een muziekje op...

Oke Wall Street dus... Als we dit onderstaande Engels-talige bericht van deze website mogen geloven gaat men dus nu wel degelijk de mogelijkheden onder de loep nemen om de verantwoordelijken voor de financiële crisis te vervolgen. Leest U ondanks de Engels-talige tekst toch even mee?

The bipartisan panel appointed by Congress to investigate the financial crisis has concluded that several financial industry figures appear to have broken the law and has referred multiple cases to state or federal authorities for potential prosecution, according to two sources directly involved in the deliberations.

The sources, who spoke on condition they not be named, declined to identify the people implicated or the names of their institutions. But they characterized the panel's decision to make referrals to prosecutors as a significant escalation in the government's response to the financial crisis. The panel plans to release its final report in Washington on Thursday morning. In the three years since major lenders teetered on the brink of collapse, prompting huge taxpayer rescues and amplifying an already painful recession into the most punishing downturn since the Depression, public indignation has swelled while few people who played prominent roles in the crisis have faced legal consequences.

That may be about to change. According to the law that created the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, the panel has a responsibility to refer for prosecution any evidence of lawbreaking. The offices that have received the referrals -- the Justice Department, state attorneys general, and perhaps both -- must now determine whether to prosecute cases and, if so, whether to pursue criminal or civil charges. Though civil charges appear a more likely outcome should prosecution result, one source familiar with the panel's deliberations said criminal charges should not be ruled out.

The commission's decision to refer conduct for prosecution underscores the severity of the activities it has uncovered and plans to detail in its widely anticipated final report, the sources said. A spokesman for the commission declined to comment. "I cannot comment on the commission's report or its activities until January 27th," said the spokesman, Tucker Warren.

When the 10-member panel was first convened in late 2009, participants emphasized that they did not intend to focus on prosecution, but were rather intent on illuminating the root causes of the crisis. Indeed, the fact that the body has opted to make referrals adds an unexpected coda to a proceeding that some observers have written off as just another bit of Washington stagecraft aimed at generating headlines.

"Few will notice its absence," said Michael Perino, a law professor at St. John's University School of Law in New York and an expert in financial history, in an opinion piece published in the New York Times last October. It "had no discernible influence over the financial reforms." He added: "How did this commission fail so badly?" But the decision to refer cases for potential prosecution could provoke a different conclusion: It may yet satisfy public craving for what Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner once referred to as the "very deep public desire for Old Testament justice." The commission's report is supposed to detail the definitive causes of the crisis. Over the course of the past year, the panel has interviewed more than 700 witnesses, reviewed millions of pages of documents, and held 19 days of public hearings across the country.

Among those who testified were the heads of the nation's largest financial institutions -- all of them recipients of multi-billion dollar public bailouts. Among those who testified were Lloyd Blankfein, chief executive of Goldman Sachs Group Inc.; Jamie Dimon, chief of JPMorgan Chase & Co.; and Robert Rubin, a former Goldman chief and Clinton administration Treasury Secretary, who later held a prime executive chair at Citigroup. The panel also questioned Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and his predecessor, Alan Greenspan. The commission drew on testimony from less prominent senior executives with intimate knowledge of how Wall Street engaged in modern-day financial alchemy, turning mountains of dubious mortgages into seemingly rock-solid investments rated as safe as American Treasury bonds.

Richard Bowen, former chief underwriter for Citigroup's consumer-lending unit, testified that, in the middle of 2006, he discovered more than 60 percent of the mortgages the bank had purchased from other firms and then sold to investors were "defective," meaning they did not satisfy the bank's own lending criteria. Keith Johnson, former president of Clayton Holdings, one of the top mortgage research companies, testified that some 28 percent of the loans given to homeowners with poor credit examined by his firm for Wall Street banks failed to meet basic standards. Yet nearly half appear to have been sold to investors regardless, he added.

The commission has been dogged by partisan sniping within its ranks and high staff turnover. But the referrals may mollify criticism that the panel was more about conveying the illusion of an investigation than conducting the real thing.Bron: Huffington Post Al met al  meer dan reden genoeg het hier eens verder te bespreken leek me. In de comments hieronder kunt u zoals immer Uw ding kwijt!  
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S.G.I.G. Temple Admin
S.G.I.G. Temple Admin
Berichten: 5033
Lid geworden op: za 21 aug 2010, 06:38

http://www.nu.nl/economie/2430420/oorza ... -vaag.html

Oorzaak bankencrisis VS blijft vaag
Uitgegeven: 24 januari 2011 20:54
Laatst gewijzigd: 24 januari 2011 23:34

WASHINGTON - De Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission deed in de VS twintig maanden onderzoek naar de bankencrisis, maar de parlementscommissie komt deze week niet met een eenduidige conclusie.
© ThinkstockVolgens persbureau Reuters, dat stukken inzag, komen er donderdag drie verschillende conclusies naar buiten waar de verschillende politieke partijen mee uit de voeten kunnen.

De democraten leggen de schuld vooral bij het te machtige Wall Street en het gebrek aan regulering.

De republikein Peter Wallison komt met een eigen rapport dat de schuld vooral bij het huizenbeleid van de overheid legt.

Drie andere Republikeinen houden de banken uit de wind en leggen de schuld eerder bij een samenloop van omstandigheden die in de hele wereld spelen.


De parlementscommissie is in mei 2009 aan het werk gegaan. Een jaar geleden moesten de topmannen van de grote banken als Goldman Sachs, Citigroup en JPMorgan Chase zich voor de commissie verantwoorden.
Knight of the Sun
Knight of the Sun
Berichten: 1547
Lid geworden op: za 09 okt 2010, 09:54

Ik heb weinig vertrouwen in Commissies...

Allemaal van hetzelfde laken en pak ;-)
Berichten: 42
Lid geworden op: di 19 okt 2010, 12:58

Het zou niet gek zijn als de verantwoordelijke worden aangepakt. En weet je, ik zeg altijd maar zo. Eerlijk duurt het langst. En ik denk wel dat er wat uit de onderzoeken van die commissie kan komen. En dan sue the basterds! :)
Sun God
Sun God
Berichten: 4292
Lid geworden op: vr 12 nov 2010, 22:26

Drie andere Republikeinen houden de banken uit de wind en leggen de schuld eerder bij een samenloop van omstandigheden die in de hele wereld spelen.

Uiteraard, ik verwacht niets anders.

De parlementscommissie is in mei 2009 aan het werk gegaan. Een jaar geleden moesten de topmannen van de grote banken als Goldman Sachs, Citigroup en JPMorgan Chase zich voor de commissie verantwoorden.

Ach, het zal zo aflopen: ze krijgen een tikje op de vingers, mogen aanblijven en krijgen een miljardenbonus, OF ze moeten weg en krijgen een miljardenbonus.
Enter een nieuw stel graaierds.

Lood om oud ijzer.

Het zou niet gek zijn als de verantwoordelijke worden aangepakt. En weet je, ik zeg altijd maar zo. Eerlijk duurt het langst. En ik denk wel dat er wat uit de onderzoeken van die commissie kan komen. En dan sue the basterds! :)

Mijnheer is een optimist? :D
QoFFee Slut
QoFFee Slut
Berichten: 131
Lid geworden op: do 06 jan 2011, 00:00

"Toch vervolging Wall Street"

Zou er ook een vervolging van de Banksters komen?

WikiLeaksangst slaat toe bij banken

NEW YORK -WikiLeaks-voorman Julian Assange geniet van het ongemak dat een aangekondigd ''megalek'' veroorzaakt bij Amerikaanse banken. De beroepsklokkenluider heeft aangekondigd begin 2011 tienduizenden interne documenten van een grote Amerikaanse bank te verspreiden

''Ik vind dit fantastisch. Al die banken zijn doodsbenauwd, omdat ze denken dat het wel eens om hen zou kunnen gaan'', stelt Assange in een interview met Amerikaanse nieuwsprogramma 60 Minutes, dat zondag wordt uitgezonden door CBS.

Enkele fragmenten uit het vraaggesprek zijn al vrijgegeven. Assange verwacht dat het vrijgeven van de documenten zal leiden tot een onderzoek naar de praktijken van de betreffende bank.

De klokkenluidersparanoia kan ook op de beurs grote gevolgen hebben voor bedrijven. Zo daalde de koers van Bank of America in november met 3 procent, omdat investeerders vreesden dat interne informatie op straat zou belanden.

Die angst was niet ongegrond: Assange stelde al in 2009 over 5 gigabyte aan informatie over de bank te beschikken, van een van de harde schijven van een bankbestuurder.

http://www.nu.nl/internet/2434311/wikil ... anken.html
S.G.I.G. Temple Admin
S.G.I.G. Temple Admin
Berichten: 16022
Lid geworden op: za 21 aug 2010, 21:27

Wall Street's Collapse to Be Mystery Forever: Jonathan Weil

By Jonathan Weil - Jan 28, 2011
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-2 ... -weil.html

To get to the heart of what went wrong with the report released yesterday by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, check out its account on page 254 of how the largest investor in a cash fund managed by Bank of America suddenly pulled out $20 billion of its money in November 2007.

The withdrawal crippled the fund, which had $40 billion of assets at its peak, forcing Bank of America to step in and prop it up. The commission included a note about the episode in the back of its report.

“The identity of the investor has never been publicly disclosed,” it says. The note then referred readers to the source of the information: A couple of stories published in December 2007 by Bloomberg News and the New York Times.

And here I had thought the purpose of the commission’s inquiry was to uncover new facts that the public didn’t already know. Such as: The identity of the mystery investor that single- handedly kneecapped Bank of America’s Columbia Strategic Cash Portfolio, once the largest cash fund of its kind in the U.S. The commission had subpoena power. It should have been able to get this information. It didn’t, though.

This, in journalistic parlance, is what we call a clip job. And that’s the trouble with much of the commission’s 545-page report. There’s lots of breezy, magazine-style, narrative prose. But there’s not much new information.

You can tell the writers knew they were sprinkling MSG on a bunch of recycled material, too, by the way they described their sources. The text and accompanying notes often seem deliberately unclear about whether the commission had dug up its own facts, or was rehashing information already disclosed in court records, news articles or other congressional inquiries.

Old News

For instance, we’re told how a former Bear Stearns hedge- fund manager, Matthew Tannin, sent an e-mail in April 2007 to colleague Ralph Cioffi that said: “Looks pretty damn ugly.” (A few days later they told investors they were confident about their funds, which held subprime mortgage bonds.) The report cites the e-mail as the source for the quote. What it doesn’t say is that the e-mail came out in court records that were widely publicized in 2009.

The report does break some morsels of news. Before it imploded, Bear Stearns used to rely on “window dressing” to make its quarterly balance sheets look smaller. Moody’s Investors Service assumed a 4 percent annual increase in home prices to justify AAA ratings for mortgage-backed securities that later blew up. More such tidbits surely will emerge as reporters and bloggers plow through the report’s pages.

Stating the Obvious

The bulk of it, though, covers ground that was largely known, or at least not all that surprising. (I bought my copy at a local bookstore in Manhattan on Wednesday, the day before the commission’s intended release date, and spent the last two days reading it.)

The report’s conclusions were obvious: The financial crisis was man-made and avoidable. Regulators and credit-rating companies blew it. Banks and homeowners borrowed too much. Companies such as AIG and Lehman Brothers had horrible governance. Ethics and accountability broke down. The government panicked when the crisis hit in 2008. And so forth.

The lack of new insights dovetailed with the commission’s non-confrontational approach. More than 700 people granted interviews, most behind closed doors. Only seldom did the panel issue subpoenas.

Ferdinand Pecora, the chief counsel who led the Senate Banking Committee’s landmark hearings on the 1929 stock market crash, wrote a memoir years later called “Wall Street Under Oath.” A good title for this week’s report would be Wall Street on the Couch.” It remains to be seen whether the commission will make public all the investigative materials it accumulated, as the Pecora Commission did in 1934.

Predictable Failure

The FCIC’s failure was predictable from the start. To examine the causes of the financial crisis, Congress created a bipartisan panel of 10 political appointees led by Democrat Phil Angelides, a former California state treasurer. What was needed was a nonpartisan investigation directed by seasoned prosecutors (like Pecora was) who know how to cross-examine witnesses and get answers.

Whereas Pecora had no fixed deadline, Congress gave the crisis commission until December 2010 to complete its inquiry. Witnesses who didn’t want to cooperate fully could simply milk the clock. The panel got a budget of less than $10 million to investigate all the causes of the financial crisis. Lehman’s bankruptcy examiner got $42 million to produce a 2,200-page report on the failure of a single company.

This week’s report will serve a useful purpose. For anyone who doesn’t know much about the financial crisis, the book is a good, condensed version that’s worth reading, even if it doesn’t add much to the public’s body of knowledge.

“There is still much to learn, much to investigate, and much to fix,” the commission wrote in the preface to its report. That also would make a fitting epitaph.

Jonathan Weil is a Bloomberg News columnist. The opinions expressed are his own.)

To contact the writer of this column: Jonathan Weil in New York at jweil6@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this column: James Greiff at jgreiff@bloomberg.net
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