Julian Assange gearresteerd!

Politiek en oorlog zijn onlosmakelijk met elkaar verbonden en alles over politiek en oorlog kun je hier terugvinden.
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jasmin
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Lid geworden op: wo 08 dec 2010, 22:09

vr 10 dec 2010, 19:32

Uit het bovenstaande kan je een paar dingen halen:

1. elk document wordt zorgvuldig gelezen voor eventuele publicatie
2. betrokken partijen wordt aangeboden mee te kijken, en eventueel suggesties voor redactie te geven
Het State Department van de VS heeft dat aanbod afgeslagen, en ook het aanbod tot minimalisering van schade...

Kennelijk was Israel slimmer, en heeft het aanbod wel aangenomen. Dit wordt niet direct gezegd, maar ik meende wel te begrijpen dat er gesprekken waren geweest met Israel, dat Assange de intelligentie opmerkte van Netanyahu.
Plus dat de kritieken terecht hebben opgemerkt dat er tot nu toe weinig direct belastend materiaal voor Israel is vrij gegeven.

Ik ga nog helemaal geen eindconclusies trekken. Gewoon informatie ordenen.
Bovenstaande bewijst totaal niet dat Assange een agent van Israel is. Anders waren er zowiezo geen gesprekken geweest, die fase zou logiserwijs overbodig geweest zijn. De afspraken en uitkomsten zijn nu nog niet duidelijk.
De vrijgave van documenten is nog niet compleet. Misschien zitten die wegelaten documenten wel in het virtuele bompakketje van Wiki... zijn levensverzekering....
want als ik mijn oude ingang weer oppak: volg de psyche van Assange... zou dat nl het geval zijn...

en ha, ha... vandaar dat ze hem prijzen en niet boos maken... voor het moment dan.. kan over drie maanden weer anders liggen...
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combi
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Lid geworden op: za 21 aug 2010, 21:27

vr 10 dec 2010, 20:25

US embassy cables: Dutch sceptical about Serb cooperation on war crimes

Tuesday, 28 July 2009, 02:18
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 078274
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 07/14/2019
TAGS OVIP (CLINTON, HILLARY), PGOV, PREL, KDEV, ECON,
NL, IS, SR
SUBJECT: (U) Secretary Clinton's July 14 conversation

with Dutch Foreign Minister Verhagen

1. Classified by Bureau Assistant Secretary Philip H. Gordon. Reason: 1.4 (d)

2. (U) July 14; 2:45 p.m.; Washington, DC.

3. (SBU) Participants:

U.S. The Secretary Charge Michael Gallagher EUR A/S Philip H. Gordon PA Spokesperson Ian Kelly Executive Assistant Joe Macmanus NSC Director for Europe Toby Bradley Valerie Belon (EUR Notetaker)

The Netherlands FM Maxime Verhagen Ambassador Renee Jones-Bos Pieter De Gooijer, MFA Political Director General Jack Twiss, Embassy Political Counselor Marcel de Vink, Private Secretary Bart Rijs, MFA Spokesman

4. (C) SUMMARY. The Secretary met July 14 with Dutch Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen, following Prime Minister Balkenende's morning meeting with President Obama. They discussed strategic and operational coordination in Afghanistan, noting initiatives to improve cell phone communications and a southern airfield. Verhagen expressed satisfaction with the President's invitation to PM Balkenende to attend the upcoming G20 summit in Pittsburgh. They discussed next steps to establish an objective metric to assess Serbian cooperation with the ICTY, noting FM Verhagen's continued skepticism that Serbia was fully cooperating on investigations. EUR A/S Gordon thought feedback from teams implementing U.S. assistance should provide a better idea of any gap between Serbian promises and actions. FM Verhagen said he was closely and optimistically following progress toward a re-start of Middle East peace talks and, less optimistically, events in Iran, offering to help better align European positions to support U.S. efforts. END SUMMARY.

-------------

Afghanistan

-------------

5. (C) The Secretary said she looked forward to continuing Dutch advice about our strategic approach in Afghanistan. The U.S. strategy owed a lot to the 3-D approach (defense, diplomacy, development) that the Dutch had pioneered. On the future level of Dutch activities in Afghanistan, FM Verhagen noted PM Balkenende had made clear in his morning meeting with President Obama that although there were differences within the Dutch coalition government that were still being worked out, he was convinced the Dutch would stay in some capacity in Afghanistan and continue to build on their experience with the 3D approach. He viewed fighting corruption and supporting democratic elections as key elements of the current focus in Afghanistan.

6. (C) When the Secretary mentioned the U.S. initiative to locate new cell phone towers on outposts that we control, Verhagen agreed to look into doing the same at Dutch bases in the south. Up to then, the Taliban had been very successful at making cell communication "go dark" at night, hampering the U.S. ability to communicate. The Secretary also said that the successful cell phone tax should be applied to insurance needed to protect against damage and sabotage of cell phone towers. Verhagen highlighted a Dutch initiative to expand the U.S.-built airfield in Tarin Kowt, the capital of Uruzgan, noting that making it available for civilian use would make security investments more sustainable.

------

STATE 00078274 002 OF 003

7. (C) The Secretary welcomed Dutch participation in the G20 Pittsburgh Summit, and noted, in particular, the credibility the Dutch brought to development issues as a world leader in foreign development assistance. Verhagen said the GONL welcomed the invitation to the G20 meeting.

------

Serbia

------

8. (C) The Secretary said the United States understood Dutch concerns about Serb cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and was looking for an objective metric to measure cooperation. Verhagen welcomed the U.S. offer to share feedback from an FBI fugitive recovery team dispatched to Belgrade. Verhagen agreed the Serbs had made progress, but remained concerned that they were not cooperating "to the maximum," according to the prosecutor's recent report. He agreed that a more pro- European government was unlikely, but the EU Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) could not be unblocked without full cooperation with the ICTY, which provided for the extradition of Ratko Mladic to The Hague. Verhagen expressed concern that the Serbs might make promises and fail to deliver, and the Dutch offers of assistance had not been accepted. Further, Dutch proposals to look into other EU sweeteners that fell short of implementing the SAA had also been rejected. "Serbian leaders are only interested in an SAA; they say one thing in person, another to the international press, and another to their own publics," Verhagen said. A/S Gordon said the FBI team would provide a better idea of what gap remained between Serbian promises and actions.

----------------------

Development Assistance

----------------------

9. (SBU) The Secretary also credited the Dutch as a leading donor country. She asked Verhagen for his advice on establishing metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of international development activities. She added that as the United States embarked on the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), she would be very interested in learning from the Dutch experience.

------------------

Middle East Peace

------------------

10. (C) FM Verhagen briefly raised his visit to Israel three weeks earlier; he had been closely following events, including the cancellation of Special Envoy Mitchell's planned visit, President Obama's statement, and Netanyahu's response. Verhagen said that he was indeed convinced that we could reach a breakthrough and that all sides wanted a re-start, including Syria, which he also had visited. However, a trigger was needed, which he suggested could be a moratorium on all settlement construction. The Secretary agreed that if the Israelis agreed to any moratorium, however defined, it would be unprecedented and extraordinarily significant. The Palestinians had moved against Hamas and other militants, but the Arabs had been slow to show they were also serious, she added.

11. (C) Verhagen said he was willing to be helpful to ensure the EU moved with the United States. He asked for U.S. reaction to Solana's proposed timeline, and the Secretary responded that, although Solana's speech had been excellent, there really could be no timeline for Middle East peace until negotiations resumed. She emphasized that the Quartet had been very helpful. Verhagen said he had asked Solana to set up an action plan for the EU to help implement a peace agreement, once it had been achieved. He also noted the Dutch were a main donor to the Palestinian Authority, assisting with prisons and security in Jenin as well as a large agricultural project in Gaza, for which the Dutch had secured Israeli agreement to keep the border open for

STATE 00078274 003 OF 003

-----

Iran

-----

12. (C) FM Verhagan expressed concern about Iran and proposed discussions on what to do if the United Nations Security Council proved unwilling to act. Europe and the United States should act together, but the EU was not united. Any U.S. and EU sanctions packages should be identical, in his view.
CLINTON

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-emba ... nts/218360

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combi
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vr 10 dec 2010, 20:29

Viewing cable 10THEHAGUE54, NETHERLANDS: SUPPORT FOR COPENHAGEN ACCORD

VZCZCXRO0474
RR RUEHAG RUEHDH RUEHHM RUEHPB RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTC #0054/01 0281510
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 281510Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3707
INFO RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHTC/AMCONSUL AMSTERDAM 4301

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000054

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958 DECL: 01/27/2020
TAGS SENV, KGHG, ENRG, NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: SUPPORT FOR COPENHAGEN ACCORD
REF: STATE 3080

Classified By: DCM Edwin Nolan for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The Netherlands will join the EU in inscribing a conditional emissions reduction target of 30 percent if others commit to comparable efforts. The Dutch had pushed to make the 30 percent offer unconditionally. Dutch climate officials are recalibrating their negotiating strategy after COP15 and putting greater emphasis on pragmatism. They have praised several facets of the Copenhagen Accord and are eager to make it operational. The Dutch are concerned that failure by donors to get fast-track financing flowing quickly will lead to more friction with developing countries later this year. END

SUMMARY.

--------------------------------------------- ---------
AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES CLIMATE WITH ENVIRONMENT MINISTER

--------------------------------------------- ---------

¶2. (SBU) Ambassador delivered reftel points January 13 during her initial call on Environment Minister Jacqueline Cramer. Cramer said the EU should inscribe its target as a single entity. She also emphasized the need for developed country pledges, taken as a whole, to add up to a convincing number for the developing world. She expressed concern that the January 31 annex would be insufficient because this bottom-up approach will not get to a 25 percent developed country commitment. She advocated a specific negotiating track led by the U.S. and others to determine how the developed world can come up with a convincing target. Cramer acknowledged this is a delicate process and offered Dutch help. Regarding the Dutch national goal, Cramer reiterated the Dutch government’s long-standing target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions 30 percent from 1990 levels by 2020. (Note: Most domestic environmental and energy analysts consider this unachievable. End note.) Given this ambitious domestic goal, Cramer cautioned that Dutch government and industry were looking for comparable efforts and a level playing field with other EU member states and major global emitters.

--------------------------------------------- ------------
NETHERLANDS JOINS UK IN PUSH FOR 30 PERCENT EU COMMITMENT
--------------------------------------------- ------------

¶3. (C) EmbOffs reinforced reftel points January 25 with the Dutch Foreign Ministry climate negotiator Sanne Kaasjager. He said the Netherlands would join the EU in inscribing a conditional, collective target of 30 percent (the so-called “20/30” commitment, either/or). He described a “vicious” January 20 COREPER meeting where the UK’s and the Netherlands’ push for an unconditional 30 percent target (or at least “20-30” percent, leaving the option for a figure in between) met stiff resistance from Italy and Poland. The Netherlands will not inscribe its own national target -- 30 percent by 2020 -- for fear of distracting attention from the EU target and because its national commitment is a political rather than legal one.

--------------------------------
ENTHUSIASM FOR COPENHAGEN ACCORD
--------------------------------

¶4. (C) Kaasjager said the Netherlands considered the Copenhagen Accord a significant accomplishment. Specifically, he called the Accord a “breakthrough” for setting out political consensus around the 6 to 8 most contentious issues in climate negotiations. The Dutch were pleased the Accord reiterated the 2 degree Celsius objective. Kaasjager praised President Obama’s hands-on role in securing the Accord while sharply criticizing the “inept” Qsecuring the Accord while sharply criticizing the “inept” Danish performance as chair of COP15.

¶5. (SBU) The Dutch government is taking steps to convince developing countries to “associate with” the Accord. Kaasjager has drafted messages for embassies in capitals receiving Dutch development assistance to solicit support. This is an unprecedented move for the Dutch government, which traditionally recoils at any suggestion to use aid money as political leverage. But at the annual Dutch chiefs of mission conference in mid-January, ambassadors were clamoring for guidance on how to engage and persuade developing countries on climate negotiations. However, Kaasjager said the Netherlands would find it difficult to make association with the Accord a condition to receive climate financing.

----------------------------
EU INTROSPECTION AFTER COP15
----------------------------

¶6. (C) According to Kaasjager, the Copenhagen endgame has
THE HAGUE 00000054 002 OF 002
caused the EU to take a hard look at its role in climate talks. He was taken aback by the sight of European leaders (e.g., PM Brown and Chancellor Merkel) hovering around the VIP room sofas where the Chinese, Indian, South African, and Brazilian representatives were consulting, trying in vain to get pull asides with the BASIC leaders. Kaasjager took exception with the media’s portrayal of the EU’s exclusion from the final stages of the Copenhagen talks, but delivered a harsh verdict on the EU’s performance at COP15. He lamented the lack of Member State discipline and the failure to bring a “tactical plan” -- meaning the EU was unprepared to adjust quickly to changing dynamics as the talks unfolded. He said his EU counterparts are coming around to the notion that Europe’s strategy must shift from “How to involve the U.S.?” to “How to involve China?”

------------------------------
PATH FORWARD FOR CLIMATE TALKS
------------------------------

¶7. (SBU) In a word, Kaasjager said what emerged from Copenhagen was “pragmatism.” More than ever, Dutch climate officials appreciate that climate negotiations will be an incremental “process of small steps.” They are still deliberating on what the right long-term negotiating track is going forward: bilateral cooperation between major emitters; coalitions of the willing (such as the Major Economies Forum, G20, or Greenland Dialogue); or the legalistic UN process. The Dutch think a bottom-up bilateral approach will not achieve enough emissions reductions. They worry about exclusion from MEF and G20 fora. And they are currently disenchanted with the top-down UN process vulnerable to spoiler countries. Kaasjager said the Netherlands will work to forge a middle road that is achievable and inclusive. In the near-term the Dutch are eager to use the next several months to make the Copenhagen Accord operational and bring its elements to the formal negotiating table in Bonn in June.

----------------------------
FAST-TRACK FINANCING PIVOTAL
----------------------------

¶8. (SBU) Kaasjager was particularly concerned about bottlenecks in the flow of fast-track financing envisioned in the Copenhagen Accord. Without serious effort by donor countries, he predicted a worst case scenario in which G77 members use the late 2010 Cancun meeting to accuse the developed world of failing to follow through on its fast-track financing promises. He identified three potential areas of friction with developing countries on financing: most of the pledged funding is not “additional”; it is skewed towards mitigation programs rather than adaptation; and much of it is already committed without much say from recipients. Kaasjager has circulated a proposal for donor country counterparts to meet informally at working levels with recipients countries to address these issues head-on rather than wait for them to surface as a PR disaster later.
LEVIN

http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2010/01/10THEHAGUE54.html

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vr 10 dec 2010, 20:34

US embassy cables: Revealed: US secret operation to help Visa and Mastercard

Monday, 01 February 2010, 04:41
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000228
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/RUS, EEB
TREASURY FOR TORGERSON/WRIGHT
NSC FOR MCFAUL
WHITE HOUSE FOR USTR EHAFNER
EO 12958 DECL: 01/28/2020
TAGS EINV, ETRD, RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN DRAFT BILL WOULD REQUIRE ON-SHORE CREDIT
CARD PROCESSING
REF: MOSCOW 00079
Classified By: ECONMINCOUNS Matthias Mitman for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

1.(C) SUMMARY: The latest version of the Russian draft law "On the National Payment System" contains several provisions that would disadvantage U.S. businesses. The draft law would set up a National Payment Card System (NPCS) including its own payment card that banks and payment card companies could join voluntarily. Most likely to be a consortium of state-owned banks, the NPCS operator would process the domestic payments for all members and collect processing fees estimated at $4 billion per year. The draft also forbids sending abroad any payment data for domestic transactions. Should international payment card companies such as Visa and MasterCard chose not to join the NPCS they would have to set up the infrastructure to do their Russian payment processing domestically. END SUMMARY.

2.(C) On January 27, the Russian newspaper Kommersant reported that it had received a copy of the "final" version of the draft legislation "On the National Payment System." Visa's Public Relations Head Dmitriy Vishnyakov, who along with MasterCard representatives met Ministry of Finance officials on January 22, told us that MinFin is still seeking consent from the various ministries and agencies involved in the legislation. Vishnyakov reported that Deputy Finance Minister Svyatugin leads MinFin's effort on this legislation, including shepherding the bill through the GOR interagency process. Vishnyakov passed a copy of the latest draft law to econoff.

To Join or Not To Join

-----------------------

3.(C) According to Visa's Vishnyakov, the latest version follows the "China model" of payment card systems. The law would set up a National Payment Card System (NPCS), which Vishnyakov reported would likely be run by a consortium of state banks as either a non-profit entity or a joint stock, profit-making company. Banks and credit card companies would have the option of joining the NPCS. If they joined, banks in Russia would issue cards under the NPCS brand, with its own logo. Payment processing for these cards would be done on-shore by the NPCS entity. According to the Kommersant article, the fees for these services are estimated at Rb 120 billion ($4 billion) annually. As Vishnyakov pointed out, the vast majority of Visa's business in Russia is done with cards issued and used in Russia; with earnings from processing going to NPCS, Visa would no longer profit from these transactions.

4.(C) While joining the NPCS would be optional for both banks and international payment card companies, membership has its privileges. If Visa and MasterCard choose to join the NPCS, they would not have any role in domestic transaction processing, but the bank-issued NPCS cards could be "co-branded" with Visa or MasterCard. When the cardholder used his card abroad, the transaction theoretically would go through the normal Visa or MasterCard processing that takes place outside of Russia. While Vishnyakov said such a deal is a possibility, it would require negotiations to specify this approach in the draft law.

ON-SHORE PAYMENT PROCESSING REQUIRED

------------------------------------

5.(C) In the proposed draft of the law, if international payment card companies choose not to join the NPCS, they will have to set up on-shore processing centers. But neither Visa nor MasterCard representatives, which together have 85% of the Russian payment card market, are willing to say whether they would be willing to do so. MasterCard's Head in Russia, Ilya Riaby, said MasterCard would have to "build and assess the business model of setting up on-shore processing" before it could reach a decision. The draft law stipulates that international payment card companies will have one year to establish processing centers inside of Russia. (Note: Currently no international companies have processing centers in Russia.) A ban on sending abroad payment data for purely domestic transactions will become effective two years after the law enters into force.

6.(C) According to Vishnyakov, MinFin understands that this

MOSCOW 00000228 002 OF 002

would entail so much expense and difficulty for Visa and MasterCard that the two companies might quit the Russian domestic market. Vishnyakov believes that, at least at the Deputy Minister level, MinFin's hands are tied. Implying that Russian security services were behind this decision, Vishnyakov said, "There is some se-cret (government) order that no one has seen, but everyone has to abide by it." As described reftel, credit card company and bank representatives have told us that GOR officials apparently assume that US payment systems routinely share data associated with payment transactions by Russian cardholders with intelligence services in the US and elsewhere.

STATE EMPLOYEES ALL GET NPCS CARDS

----------------------------------

7.(C) The current draft of the law would require all stated-owned enterprises and all state employees to be issued NPCS cards and to receive their salaries via electronic deposit into NPCS member-banks. (Note: Eighty percent of payment card holders have what are called "salary cards," a type of debit card negotiated between the employer and a bank. Historically, employees have used their salary cards almost exclusively to withdraw their salaries at the beginning of each month, though they can also use them as debit cards.) One positive aspect of the latest version of the law is that vendors are not required to accept NPCS cards, as was required in earlier versions.

COMMENT

-------

8.(C) This draft law continues to disadvantage U.S. payment card market leaders Visa and MasterCard, whether they join the National Payment Card System or not. If they join, the NPCS operator will collect the fees, leaving them to collect processing fees only when card-holders travel abroad -- a tiny section of the market. If they do not join but choose to compete with NPCS cards, they will have to set up payment processing centers in Russia, a very large investment in itself, and compete against a system likely backed by the largest Russian state banks. While the draft legislation has yet to be submitted to the Duma and can still be amended, post will continue to raise our concerns with senior GOR officials. We recommend that senior USG officials also take advantage of meetings with their Russian counterparts, including through the Bilateral Presidential Commission, to press the GOR to change the draft text to ensure U.S. payment companies are not adversely affected. END COMMENT.

Beyrle

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-emba ... CMP=twt_gu

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jasmin
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Lid geworden op: wo 08 dec 2010, 22:09

vr 10 dec 2010, 21:39

Thnx Combi!!

Die middelste was me al bekend. Nummer 1 en 3 niet. Die ga ik vanmiddag doorlezen (tussen het posten door druk met andere dingen).

Dat met Visa en Mastercard duikt voor de tweede keer omhoog. Ook al die vrouw van D'66 die zich daarover druk maakt in Brussel. http://www.trouw.nl/nieuws/media-techno ... uropa.html

Ik heb trouwens ook gelezen over Egypte, en relatie Israël, Iran. Kom ik later wel mee.
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langeharry
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vr 10 dec 2010, 22:04

Net via de mail binnen gekregen..

Beste vrienden,

De huiveringwekkende intimidatiecampagne tegen WikiLeaks (terwijl ze geen enkele wet overtreden hebben) is een aanval op de persvrijheid en de democratie. We hebben snel een massale publieke oproep nodig om deze hetze te stoppen -- laten we 1 miljoen stemmen verzamelen en nog deze week paginagrote advertenties in Amerikaanse dagbladen plaatsen!


De massale intimidatiecampagne tegen WikiLeaks veroorzaakt huiveringen bij alle voorstanders van de persvrijheid.

Rechtsgeleerden zeggen dat WikiLeaks waarschijnlijk geen wetten heeft overtreden. Maar toch hebben Amerikaanse politici het een terroristengroep genoemd en commentatoren hebben aangedrongen op het vermoorden van zijn personeel. De organisatie ondergaat een massale aanval van regeringen en bedrijven, maar WikiLeaks publiceert enkel informatie die bezorgd werd door een klokkenluider. WikiLeaks is ook partnerschappen aangegaan met de belangrijkste dagbladen van de wereld (NYT, Guardian, Spiegel enz.) om de informatie zorgvuldig door te nemen vooraleer ze te publiceren.

Deze massale buitenwettelijke bedreiging van WikiLeaks is een aanval op de democratie. We hebben snel een publieke oproep nodig in naam van de persvrijheid en vrijheid van meningsuiting. Teken de petitie om deze hetze te stoppen en stuur deze e-mail naar iedereen -- laten we 1 miljoen stemmen verzamelen en nog deze week paginagrote advertenties in Amerikaanse dagbladen plaatsen!

http://www.avaaz.org/nl/wikileaks_petition/?vl

WikiLeaks werkt niet alleen -- ze zijn partners van de belangrijkste dagbladen in de wereld (New York Times, The Guardian, Der Spiegel, enz.) die 250.000 Amerikaanse diplomatieke berichten zorgvuldig nakijken en alle informatie verwijderen waarvan publicatie onverantwoordelijk is. Slechts 800 berichten werden tot op heden gepubliceerd. Vorige WikiLeaks publicaties hebben door de regering gesteunde martelingen, het doden van onschuldige burgers in Irak en Afghanistan, en corruptie binnen bedrijven blootgelegd.

De Amerikaanse regering onderzoekt momenteel alle mogelijke wettelijke manieren om WikiLeaks te verhinderen nog meer berichten te publiceren, maar de democratische wetten beschermen de persvrijheid. De VS en andere regeringen houden misschien niet van wetten die onze vrijheid van meningsuitingen beschermen, maar precies daarom is het zo belangrijk dat ze bestaan, en waarom enkel een democratische procedure hen kan veranderen.

Verstandige mensen kunnen verschillen van mening over het feit dat WikiLeaks en de belangrijkste dagbladen, waarmee het partner is, meer informatie vrijgeven dan wat iedereen zou mogen weten, of als die vrijgave de diplomatieke vertrouwelijkheid ondermijnt en of dat wel een toelaatbare zaak is. Of indien de oprichter van WikiLeaks, Julian Assange, persoonlijk moet beschouwd worden als een held of een boosdoener. Maar al het voorgaande rechtvaardigt geenszins een gemene campagne met bedreiging tot afsluiting van wettelijke mediakanalen door regeringen en bedrijven. Klik hieronder om mee te doen aan de oproep om die aanval te stoppen:

http://www.avaaz.org/nl/wikileaks_petition/?vl

Heb je je ooit reeds afgevraagd waarom de media zo zelden een volledig verhaal brengen van wat achter de schermen gebeurt? Dit is de reden: - want als ze dit doen, kunnen de regeringen gemeen reageren. En als dit gebeurt, moeten de mensen opkomen voor hun democratisch recht op persvrijheid en vrijheid van meningsuiting. Nog nooit was er een meer levensbelangrijk tijdstip voor ons om te reageren.

Met hoop,
Ricken, Emma, Alex, Alice, Maria Paz en alle leden van het Avaaz team.

BRONNEN:

ZapLog - Zin en onzin over Wikileaks, Assange en Cablegate
http://zaplog.nl/zaplog/article/zin_en_ ... _cablegate


In Engels:
ABC - Rechtsdeskundigen zeggen dat WikiLeaks zuiver is
http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/conten ... 086781.htm

Mail Online - WikiLeaks is een bende terroristen, zegt vooraanstaand Amerikaans congreslid
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article ... -King.html

Financial Times - Hackers kunnen ons helpen
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d3dd7c40-ff15 ... z17QvQ4Ht5

Yahoo - Amazon verwijdert WikiLeaks door politieke druk
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20101201/tc ... ressamazon

PC World - Wraak van hackers voor WikiLeaks:
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/a ... vists.html

Tippett.org - Amerikaanse regering toont ware controle op het internet door de expansiebeperking van WikiLeaks
http://www.tippett.org/2010/12/us-gov-s ... ntainment/

The Guardian - Schuldigen van de VS ambassade-berichten moeten terechtgesteld worden, zegt Mike Huckabee
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/de ... e-huckabee

The Christian Science Monitor - WikiLeaks door Mastercard en Visa in de steek gelaten. Wie volgt?
http://www.csmonitor.com/Innovation/Hor ... Who-s-next

The Slatest - Assange's Interpol Uitleveringsverzoek is voor seks zonder condoom
http://slatest.slate.com/id/2276690/
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combi
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vr 10 dec 2010, 22:38

The Slatest - Assange's Interpol Uitleveringsver zoek is voor seks zonder condoom
hej! interpol als jullie toch zo druk bezig zijn.


US embassy cables: Afghan government asks US to quash 'dancing boys' scandal

Wednesday, 24 June 2009, 11:37
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001651
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/A, INL, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR WOOD
OSD FOR FLOURNOY
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICENT
KABUL FOR COS USFOR-A
EO 12958 DECL: 06/23/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MARR, MASS, AF
SUBJECT: 06/23/09 MEETING, ASSISTANT AMB MUSSOMELI AND MOI
MINISTER ATMAR: KUNDUZ DYNCORP PROBLEM, TRANSPORT FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES AND OTHER TOPICS
REF: KABUL 1480
Classified By: POLMIL COUNSELOR ROBERT CLARKE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND ( D)

1. (C) SUMMARY: Assistant Ambassador Mussomeli discussed a range of issues with Minister of Interior (MoI) Hanif Atmar on June 23. On the Kunduz Regional Training Center (RTC) DynCorp event of April 11 (reftel), Atmar reiterated his insistence that the U.S. try to quash any news article on the incident or circulation of a video connected with it. He continued to predict that publicity would "endanger lives." He disclosed that he has arrested two Afghan police and nine other Afghans as part of an MoI investigation into Afghans who facilitated this crime of "purchasing a service from a child." He pressed for CSTC-A to be given full control over the police training program, including contractors. Mussomeli counseled that an overreaction by the Afghan goverment (GIRoA) would only increase chances for the greater publicity the MoI is trying to forestall.

2. (C) On armored vehicles and air transport for presidential candidates, Atmar pitched strongly to have the GIRoA decide which candidates were under threat and to retain control of allocation of these assets. He agreed with the principle of a level playing field for candidates but argued that "direct support by foreigners" demonstrated a lack of confidence in GIRoA. If GIRoA failed to be fair, international assets and plans in reserve could be used. On another elections-related issue, Atmar claimed that two Helmand would-be provincial candidates (and key Karzai supporters) disqualified under DIAG rules had actually possessed weapons as part of a GIRoA contract to provide security for contractors.

3. (C) Atmar also was enthusiastic about working out arrangements with the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) in RC-South to partner with the Afghan Border Police (ABP) on training and joint operations to extend GIRoA governance south. He is considering giving BG Melham, a highly regarded Afghan officer, responsibility for ABP in Nimruz and Helmand provinces. END SUMMARY.

KUNDUZ RTC DYNCORP UPDATE

4. (C) On June 23, Assistant Ambassador Mussomeli met with MOI Minister Hanif Atmar on a number of issues, beginning with the April 11 Kunduz RTC DynCorp investigation. Amb Mussomeli opened that the incident deeply upset us and we took strong steps in response. An investigation is on-going, disciplinary actions were taken against DynCorp leaders in Afghanistan, we are also aware of proposals for new procedures, such as stationing a military officer at RTCs, that have been introduced for consideration. (Note: Placing military officers to oversee contractor operations at RTCs is not legally possible under the currentDynCorp contract.) Beyond remedial actions taken, we still hope the matter will not be blown out of proportion, an outcome which would not be good for either the U.S. or Afghanistan. A widely-anticipated newspaper article on the Kunduz scandal has not appeared but, if there is too much noise that may prompt the journalist to publish.

5. (C) Atmar said he insisted the journalist be told that publication would endanger lives. His request was that the U.S. quash the article and release of the video. Amb Mussomeli responded that going to the journalist would give her the sense that there is a more terrible story to report. Atmar then disclosed the arrest of two Afghan National Police (ANP) and nine other Afghans (including RTC language assistants) as part of an MoI investigation into Afghan "facilitators" of the event. The crime he was pursuing was "purchasing a service from a child," which in Afghanistan is illegal under both Sharia law and the civil code, and against the ANP Code of Conduct for police officers who might be involved. He said he would use the civil code and that, in this case, the institution of the ANP will be protected, but he worried about the image of foreign mentors. Atmar said that President Karzai had told him that his (Atmar's) "prestige" was in play in management of the Kunduz DynCorp matter and another recent event in which Blackwater contractors mistakenly killed several Afghan citizens. The President had asked him "Where is the justice?"

6. (C) Atmar said there was a larger issue to consider. He

KABUL 00001651 002 OF 003

understood that within DynCorp there were many "wonderful" people working hard, and he was keen to see proper action taken to protect them; but, these contractor companies do not have many friends. He was aware that many questions about them go to SRAP Holbrooke and, in Afghanistan, there is increasing public skepticism about contractors. On the other hand, the conduct of the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is disciplined. Looking at these facts, he said, he wanted CSTC-A in charge. He wanted the ANP to become a model security institution just like the Afghan National Army (ANA) and National Directorate for Security (NDS), and the contractors were not producing what was desired. He suggested that the U.S. establish and independent commission to review the mentor situation, an idea he said Ambassador Eikenberry had first raised. Atmar added that he also wanted tighter control over Afghan employees. He was convinced that the Kunduz incident, and other events where mentors had obtained drugs, could not have happened without Afghan participation.

ARMORED VEHICLES (AND AIR TRANSPORT) FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

7. (C) Atmar expressed strong opinions about the use of armored vehicles for travel by presidential candidates that he has requested be provided to MoI by the U.S. and UK. He said it was up to MoI to decide whether a candidate was under threat or not. Atmar opined that it should be an MoD responsibility to provide air transport for presidential candidates. Amb Mussomeli explained that we want a level playing field, which Atmar agreed was necessary. However, Atmar said there were two important considerations: 1) some of the electorate will view that the candidates are controlled by foreigners if provided non-GIRoA transport; and 2) bypassing the MoI or MoD with "direct support by foreigners" demonstrated a lack of confidence in the Afghanistan government. When Amb Mussomeli said MOD lacked adequate aircraft to cover all candidates, Atmar responded that MoD could ask ISAF for help but should retain control of the travel. Amb Mussomeli pointed out that some reasonably worried that such a plan will falter or will not be fairly implemented. Atmar answered "Just give us a chance. If we fail, then you have your own planes and plans in reserve."

DIAG-DISQUALIFIED CANDIDATES IN HELMAND

8. (C) In a discussion on two would-be provincial election candidates in Helmand who were disqualified by the Disbandment of Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG) program, Atmar said he had looked into requests to stand firm against their reinstatement, but it was a "big, contentious issue that is not explainable to President Karzai." Atmar said that the only reason these two candidates were barred was for having weapons, apparently against DIAG rules. In fact, he said, they were "contracted by the state" to have those weapons in order to provide security for contractors. He acknowledged that the "contract" had not been properly registered, and suggested that the GIRoA would take care of the registration.

AFGHAN BORDER POLICE (ABP) AND PARTNERING WITH THE MARINES IN RC-SOUTH

9. (C) Atmar enthusiastically proposed an MOI meeting with the leadership of the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and CSTC-A to work out arrangements for good partnering, training, and joint operations with Afghan security forces in RC-South. The MEB would like two ABP companies (approximately 250 police) currently located near Lashkar Gah to move south, and to be mobile enough to move further south when opportunities arise. The MEB would like a customs officer to be attached to these ABP companies so that the reach of GIRoA governance can be extended when insurgent-controlled or dominated territory is opened. Atmar stopped short of making a final promise to give a highly-regarded Afghan officer, BG Melham (whom he personally respects), responsibility for the ABP in Nimruz and Helmand provinces, but he was aware of concerns about the current responsible officer (BG Noorzai).

KABUL INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL (ISK)

10. (U) Amb Mussomeli expressed concern over a plan by a District Police Chief to remove security barriers at ISK (an primary and secondary school partially dependent on USAID and other Mission funding support) that keep the road closed to

KABUL 00001651 003 OF 003

normal traffic. Removing the barriers could endanger the kids and teachers who walk between two compounds. Atmar said that he was very familiar with ISK and "no barriers would be touched," although he added that perhaps an arrangement could be made to unblock the road and have the ISK security personnel search vehicles.

EIKENBERRY

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-emba ... nts/213720

En voor de Nederlandse politici die alles!! tegen kindermisbruik wil doen.
Vast te druk zeker
:osama:

Summary

1. In a May 2009 meeting interior minister Hanif Atmar expresses deep
concerns that if lives could be in danger if news leaked that foreign
police trainers working for US commercial contractor DynCorp hired
"dancing boys" to perform for them. Key passage highlighted.
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vr 10 dec 2010, 22:48

:-* best wel grappig die dokumenten hey balki jij ook al.

Viewing cable 09STATE78274, U) Secretary Clinton’s July 14 conversation

VZCZCXRO7687
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TO RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 5813
INFO RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0575
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 2300
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 8838
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0186
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 7003
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 5334
EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

Tuesday, 28 July 2009, 02:18
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 078274
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 07/14/2019
TAGS OVIP (CLINTON, HILLARY), PGOV, PREL, KDEV, ECON,
NL, IS, SR
SUBJECT: (U) Secretary Clinton’s July 14 conversation
with Dutch Foreign Minister Verhagen
¶1. Classified by Bureau Assistant Secretary Philip H. Gordon. Reason: 1.4 (d)
¶2. (U) July 14; 2:45 p.m.; Washington, DC.
¶3. (SBU) Participants:
U.S. The Secretary Charge Michael Gallagher EUR A/S Philip H. Gordon PA Spokesperson Ian Kelly Executive Assistant Joe Macmanus NSC Director for Europe Toby Bradley Valerie Belon (EUR Notetaker)
The Netherlands FM Maxime Verhagen Ambassador Renee Jones-Bos Pieter De Gooijer, MFA Political Director General Jack Twiss, Embassy Political Counselor Marcel de Vink, Private Secretary Bart Rijs, MFA Spokesman
¶4. (C) SUMMARY. The Secretary met July 14 with Dutch Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen, following Prime Minister Balkenende’s morning meeting with President Obama. They discussed strategic and operational coordination in Afghanistan, noting initiatives to improve cell phone communications and a southern airfield. Verhagen expressed satisfaction with the President’s invitation to PM Balkenende to attend the upcoming G20 summit in Pittsburgh. They discussed next steps to establish an objective metric to assess Serbian cooperation with the ICTY, noting FM Verhagen’s continued skepticism that Serbia was fully cooperating on investigations. EUR A/S Gordon thought feedback from teams implementing U.S. assistance should provide a better idea of any gap between Serbian promises and actions. FM Verhagen said he was closely and optimistically following progress toward a re-start of Middle East peace talks and, less optimistically, events in Iran, offering to help better align European positions to support U.S. efforts. END SUMMARY.
-------------
Afghanistan
-------------
¶5. (C) The Secretary said she looked forward to continuing Dutch advice about our strategic approach in Afghanistan. The U.S. strategy owed a lot to the 3-D approach (defense, diplomacy, development) that the Dutch had pioneered. On the future level of Dutch activities in Afghanistan, FM Verhagen noted PM Balkenende had made clear in his morning meeting with President Obama that although there were differences within the Dutch coalition government that were still being worked out, he was convinced the Dutch would stay in some capacity in Afghanistan and continue to build on their experience with the 3D approach. He viewed fighting corruption and supporting democratic elections as key elements of the current focus in Afghanistan.
¶6. (C) When the Secretary mentioned the U.S. initiative to locate new cell phone towers on outposts that we control, Verhagen agreed to look into doing the same at Dutch bases in the south. Up to then, the Taliban had been very successful at making cell communication “go dark” at night, hampering the U.S. ability to communicate. The Secretary also said that the successful cell phone tax should be applied to insurance needed to protect against damage and sabotage of cell phone towers. Verhagen highlighted a Dutch initiative to expand the U.S.-built airfield in Tarin Kowt, the capital of Uruzgan, noting that making it available for civilian use would make security investments more sustainable.
------
STATE 00078274 002 OF 003
¶7. (C) The Secretary welcomed Dutch participation in the G20 Pittsburgh Summit, and noted, in particular, the credibility the Dutch brought to development issues as a world leader in foreign development assistance. Verhagen said the GONL welcomed the invitation to the G20 meeting.
------
Serbia
------
¶8. (C) The Secretary said the United States understood Dutch concerns about Serb cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and was looking for an objective metric to measure cooperation. Verhagen welcomed the U.S. offer to share feedback from an FBI fugitive recovery team dispatched to Belgrade. Verhagen agreed the Serbs had made progress, but remained concerned that they were not cooperating “to the maximum,” according to the prosecutor’s recent report. He agreed that a more pro- European government was unlikely, but the EU Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) could not be unblocked without full cooperation with the ICTY, which provided for the extradition of Ratko Mladic to The Hague. Verhagen expressed concern that the Serbs might make promises and fail to deliver, and the Dutch offers of assistance had not been accepted. Further, Dutch proposals to look into other EU sweeteners that fell short of implementing the SAA had also been rejected. “Serbian leaders are only interested in an SAA; they say one thing in person, another to the international press, and another to their own publics,” Verhagen said. A/S Gordon said the FBI team would provide a better idea of what gap remained between Serbian promises and actions.
----------------------
Development Assistance
----------------------
¶9. (SBU) The Secretary also credited the Dutch as a leading donor country. She asked Verhagen for his advice on establishing metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of international development activities. She added that as the United States embarked on the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), she would be very interested in learning from the Dutch experience.
------------------
Middle East Peace
------------------
¶10. (C) FM Verhagen briefly raised his visit to Israel three weeks earlier; he had been closely following events, including the cancellation of Special Envoy Mitchell’s planned visit, President Obama’s statement, and Netanyahu’s response. Verhagen said that he was indeed convinced that we could reach a breakthrough and that all sides wanted a re-start, including Syria, which he also had visited. However, a trigger was needed, which he suggested could be a moratorium on all settlement construction. The Secretary agreed that if the Israelis agreed to any moratorium, however defined, it would be unprecedented and extraordinarily significant. The Palestinians had moved against Hamas and other militants, but the Arabs had been slow to show they were also serious, she added.
¶11. (C) Verhagen said he was willing to be helpful to ensure the EU moved with the United States. He asked for U.S. reaction to Solana’s proposed timeline, and the Secretary responded that, although Solana’s speech had been excellent, there really could be no timeline for Middle East peace until negotiations resumed. She emphasized that the Quartet had been very helpful. Verhagen said he had asked Solana to set up an action plan for the EU to help implement a peace agreement, once it had been achieved. He also noted the Dutch were a main donor to the Palestinian Authority, assisting with prisons and security in Jenin as well as a large agricultural project in Gaza, for which the Dutch had secured Israeli agreement to keep the border open for
STATE 00078274 003 OF 003
-----
Iran
-----
¶12. (C) FM Verhagan expressed concern about Iran and proposed discussions on what to do if the United Nations Security Council proved unwilling to act. Europe and the United States should act together, but the EU was not united. Any U.S. and EU sanctions packages should be identical, in his view.
CLINTON

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/07/09STATE78274.html
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is even kijken of dat desktop alarm ding werkt ;-)

Viewing cable 09TELAVIV1098, ISRAEL, A PROMISED LAND FOR ORGANISED CRIME?

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DE RUEHTV #1098/01 1351414
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INFO RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 2041
RUCNFB/FBI WASHDC//INTD/CTD/CT WATCH//
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHDC
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC 0068
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 7509

UNCLAS TEL AVIV 001098

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CORRECTED ADDEE)

DEPT FOR CA/VO/L/C; CA/VO/L/A; CA/FPP SARAH SEXTON; INR/TIPOFF; DS
OFAC
ROME FOR DHS/ICE

CA/FPP: PLEASE PASS TO DOJ LISA HOLTYN AND BRUCE OHR
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958:N/A
TAGS: CVIS SNAR CMGT KFRD KCOR KCRM KTIP PINR IS
SUBJECT: ISRAEL, A PROMISED LAND FOR ORGANISED CRIME?

Summary
---------

¶1. (SBU) Organized crime (OC) has longstanding roots in Israel, but
in recent years there has been a sharp increase in the reach and
impact of OC networks.
In seeking a competitive advantage in such
lucrative trades as narcotics and prostitution, Israeli crime groups
have demonstrated their ability and willingness to engage in violent
attacks on each other with little regard for innocent bystanders.
The Israeli National Police (INP) and the courts have engaged in a
vigorous campaign against organized crime leaders, including the
creation of a new specialized anti-OC unit, but they remain unable
to cope with the full scope of the problem. Organized crime in
Israel now has global reach, with direct impact inside the United
States. Post is currently utilizing all available tools to deny
Israeli OC figures access to the United States in order to prevent
them from furthering their criminal activities on U.S. soil. End
Summary.

Crime War Hits the Streets of Israel
-------------------------------------

¶2. (SBU) In November 2008, Israeli crime boss Yaakov Alperon was
assassinated in broad daylight in a gruesome attack on the streets
of Tel Aviv, only about a mile away from the Embassy. According to
several media accounts, a motor scooter pulled up alongside
Alperon's car and the rider attached a sophisticated explosive
device with a remote detonator to the car door. The bomb killed
Alperon and his driver, and injured two innocent pedestrians. The
hit was the latest in a series of violent attacks and reprisals, and
indicated a widening crime war in Israel.

¶3. In July 2008, a 31-year-old Israeli woman was killed by a stray
bullet on the beach in Bat Yam in front of her husband and two
children during a failed assassination attempt on noted crime figure
Rami Amira. In a feud between the Abutbul and Shirazi clans, crime
boss Shalom "Charlie" Abutbul was shot by two gunmen in September
2008, an attack that also wounded three bystanders. In December
2008, Charlie Abutbul's son-in-law, Nati Ohayon, was gunned down in
his car in Netanya. Before the fatal bombing of his car, Alperon
himself had survived at least three previous attempts on his life
before his assassination, and was engaged in an ongoing feud with
the rival Abergil clan (although there are numerous suspects in
Alperon's murder). The day after Alperon's death, two members of
the Abergil syndicate were sentenced for conspiring to kill
Alperon's brother, Nissim, in May 2008.

¶4. (SBU) In response to rising concerns for public safety, former
Prime Minister Olmert convened an emergency meeting of top law
enforcement officials, cabinet members, and prosecutors in December
¶2008. He promised to add 1,000 officers to the INP and to allocate
approximately NIS 340 million (USD 81 million) to improve the INP's
technical capabilities. In general, the rise in OC-related violence
has led some public figures to call for emergency state powers to
attack criminal organizations, and OC became a minor but important
issue in the February 2009 Knesset elections. Former Labor Party MK
Ephraim Sneh publicly decried criminal extortion in his campaign
ads, only to have his car torched in apparent retaliation outside
his home in Herzliya.

Background
------------

¶5. (SBU) Organized criminal activity is not a new phenomenon in
Israel, and major crime families are well known to the Israeli
public (the Alperons even featured in a recent reality television
program). Five or six crime families have traditionally dominated
OC in Israel, although the names and makeup of these syndicates have
fluctuated in recent years. The Abergil, Abutbul, Alperon, and
Rosenstein organizations are among the most well known, but recent
arrests and assassinations have created a power vacuum at the top.
New names such as Mulner, Shirazi, Cohen and Domrani have moved
quickly to fill the gap. Other up-and-coming groups include the
Harari, Ohana, and Kdoshim families. There are also a number of
rival families active in the underworld of Israel's Arab sector.

¶6. (SBU) Traditional OC activities in Israel include illegal
neighborhood casinos, prostitution rings, extortion, and loan
sharking, with each family controlling a different geographic
region. The Alperon family, for instance, dominates the Sharon
region, while the Abutbul operation is based in the coastal city of
Netanya. The focus is largely on easy money guaranteed by the
limited use of violence. Criminal involvement in the recycling
business, for example, has been well covered in the press. OC

families collect bottles illegally from municipal recycling bins and
restaurants, return them at the collection centers claiming twice
the actual numbers, and pocket the change for millions in profits.

Not Your Grandfather's Mob
---------------------------

¶7. (SBU) Despite their notoriety, OC figures have generally been
viewed as a nuisance to be handled by local police. Law enforcement
resources were directed to more existential security threats from
terrorists and enemy states. In recent years, however, the rules of
the game have changed. According to xxxxx, the old school of Israel
OC is giving way to a new, more violent, breed of crime. xxxxx told conoffs that the new style of
crime features knowledge of hi-tech explosives acquired from service
in the Israeli Defense Forces, and a willingness to use
indiscriminate violence, at least against rival gang leaders. New
OC business also includes technology-related crimes, such as stock
market and credit card fraud, and operates on a global scale.

¶8. (SBU) As the reach of Israeli OC has grown, so have the stakes.
Crime families are working further from home and exporting violence
abroad. Older gambling schemes have grown to include sprawling
casino franchises in Eastern Europe. The Abutbul family began its
gambling business in Romania over a decade ago, and now owns the
Europe-wide Casino Royale network. In 2002, Israeli OC turf wars
spilled into Europe when Yaakov Abergil and Felix Abutbul were
killed two months apart. Abutbul was gunned down in front of his
casino in Prague in a show of force by the Abergils as they
attempted to capture a portion of the European gambling market.

¶9. (SBU) Israeli OC now plays a significant role in the global drug
trade, providing both a local consumer market and an important
transit point to Europe and the United States. In 2004, Zeev
Rosenstein was arrested in Israel for possession of 700,000 ecstasy
tablets in his New York apartment, destined for distribution in the
U.S. market. He was ultimately extradited to the United States in
2006, where he is currently serving a 12-year prison sentence. Two
other crime figures, Meir Abergil and Israel Ozifa, are also facing
U.S. extradition charges on charges that include smuggling 100,000
ecstasy tablets into the United States.

¶10. (SBU) The prostitution business has also grown beyond the
neighborhood brothel. In March 2009, the INP arrested twelve
suspects in what is believed to be the largest Israeli-led human
trafficking network unearthed to date. Ring leader Rami Saban and
his associates were charged with smuggling thousands of women from
the former Soviet Union and forcing them to work as prostitutes in
Israel, Cyprus, Belgium, and Great Britain. Some women were flown
to Egypt and smuggled across the Sinai border by Bedouins.

Law Enforcement Steps up the Pressure
-------------------------------------

¶11. (SBU) After years of perceived inaction, in 2008 the INP
created a new unit called Lahav 433. The elite unit operates under
the direct command of the police commissioner, and is charged
specifically with infiltrating and eliminating Israel's major crime
syndicates. Lahav 433 also cooperates closely with district
investigative units to combat smaller criminal organizations, many
of which are aligned with the larger crime families.

¶12. (SBU) Following Alperon's assassination, the INP initiated a
series of raids that led to the arrests of a number of leading crime
figures. Among their targets were Aviv and Adam Abutbul, sons of
crime-family head Charlie Abutbul, both charged with possession of
illegal weapons. (A third brother, Francois, is already facing
murder charges for a nightclub killing in 2004.) Police also
arrested gangland figure Amir Mulner for weapons possession and
conspiracy to commit a crime. Mulner is known to be an explosives
expert by army training, and is a suspect in Yaakov Alperon's
murder. He is also believed to be managing affairs for Rosenstein
while the latter serves his sentence in the United States.

¶13. (SBU) Yaakov Alperon's brother Nissim was arrested with 18
others in December 2008, in what was reported to be a "mafia
meeting" in a Tel Aviv-area caf. According to the Jerusalem Post,
the group may have been planning a revenge attack for his brother's
recent assassination. Alperon's son Dror, recently dismissed from
his army service for disorderly behavior, also faces several counts
of assault and was convicted on extortion charges. Also in
December, police in Netanya launched several raids on illegal
gambling houses and the homes of suspected money launderers with
ties to the crime families. In Ashdod, brothers Roni and David
Harari were arrested on charges of extortion. Regional police stuck
a blow against the Jerusalem Gang, and convicted its leader Itzik
Bar Muha.

Skepticism Hovers Over GOI Efforts
----------------------------------

¶14. (SBU)xxxxx told conoffs that
"thousands of foot soldiers" remain active on the streets despite
these aggressive anti-OC operations. He noted that approximately
2,000 people attended Alperon's very public funeral. xxxxx
expressed skepticism that recent arrests will bear fruit in the long
term without a sustained commitment to enforcement. He noted that
many of the crime leaders remain active while in prison and their
operations are not hampered significantly even when they are
convicted and jailed.

¶15. (SBU) In December 2008, former Prime Minister Olmert himself
admitted that efforts to combat OC have long been diluted among
different agencies, and that INP technology lags far behind that
allocated to security services for counterterrorism. Given the
recent change in government and the current economic crisis, there
is public skepticism as to whether GOI promises to remedy the
situation will be fulfilled. In 2003, following a failed
assassination attempt on Rosenstein, then Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon made similar promises to commit manpower and resources to
combating the problem.

¶16. (SBU) It is not entirely clear to what extent OC elements have
penetrated the Israeli establishment and corrupted public officials.
The INP insists that such instances are rare, despite the
occasional revelation of crooked police officers in the press.
Nevertheless, there have been several dramatic revelations in recent
years that indicate a growing problem. In 2004, former government
minister Gonen Segev was arrested for trying to smuggle thousands of
ecstasy pills into Israel, a case that produced considerable
circumstantial evidence of his involvement in OC. The election of
Inbal Gavrieli to the Knesset in 2003 as a member of Likud raised
concerns about OC influence in the party's Central Committee.
Gavrieli is the daughter of a suspected crime boss, and she
attempted to use her parliamentary immunity to block investigations
into her father's business. (Gavrieli is no longer a member of the
Knesset.) Just last month, Israeli politicos and OC figures came
together for the funeral of Likud party activist Shlomi Oz, who
served time in prison in the 1990s for extortion on behalf of the
Alperon family. Among those in attendance was Omri Sharon, son of
former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who was himself convicted in
2006 on illegal fundraising charges unrelated to OC.

Courts Testing New Powers
--------------------------

¶17. (SBU) In 2003, the GOI passed anti-OC legislation that carries
a maximum sentence of 10 years imprisonment for heading a criminal
organization and three years for working in such an organization.
The law defines such a body as a group of people working in an
"organized, methodical and ongoing pattern to commit offenses that
are defined by the laws of Israel as crimes." The law also allows
for property forfeiture, both in the wake of conviction and in cases
where it is proven to belong to a criminal organization.

¶18. (SBU) Until recently, xxxxx, judges and lawyers have been
slow to make use of this authority, and are hampered by a lack of
resources, insufficient understanding of the tools at their
disposal, and reticence to mete out tough sentences. A witness
protection program for those who testify against OC is just now
getting off the ground, and is not backed by any specific
legislation. Nevertheless, on March 16th, a Tel Aviv district court
took the important step of sentencing 14 convicted criminals
belonging to two mob organizations in Ramle and Jaffa to up to 27
years in prison.

¶19. (SBU) Increased efforts by Israeli authorities to combat OC
have engendered retaliatory threats of violence. Recent press
reports indicate that as many as 10 Israeli judges are currently
receiving 24-hour protection by the police against the threat of
violence from members of crime organizations. Israeli OC appears to
be intent on intimidating judges personally, as a way of influencing
the legal process. Judges in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa have
been assigned police protection, underscoring the depth of the
problem.

Israeli Crime Reaches American Shores
--------------------------------------

¶20. (SBU) Israel's multi-ethnic population provides a deep well of
opportunity for Israeli OC to expand into new territory. Most
Israeli crime families trace their roots to North Africa or Eastern
Europe, and many of their Israeli operatives hold foreign passports
allowing them to move freely in European countries, most of which
participate in the visa waiver program with the United States.
Approximately one million Russians moved to Israel following the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, and Russian citizens no longer
require visas to enter Israel. Many Russian oligarchs of Jewish
origin and Jewish members of OC groups have received Israeli
citizenship, or at least maintain residences in the country. Little
is known about the full extent of Russian criminal activity in
Israel, but sources in the police estimate that Russian OC has
laundered as much as USD 10 billion through Israeli holdings. While
most Israeli OC families are native-born and the stereotype that
Russian immigrants tend to be mobsters is greatly overblown,
indigenous OC groups routinely employ "muscle" from the former
Soviet Union.

¶21. (SBU) The profit motive serves as a great unifier among
Israel's diverse demographic groups. According to xxxxx, some
Amsterdam-based Hasidic groups allegedly are implicated in
international drug smuggling through links to Israeli OC. Arab and
Jewish Israeli criminals routinely cooperate and form alliances to
expand control of lucrative drug, car theft and extortion rackets.
Even hostile and closed borders pose few obstacles to OC groups.
According to the INP, 43% of intercepted heroin in 2008 was smuggled
from Lebanon, 37% from Jordan, and 12% from Egypt.

Israeli OC Operating Freely in United States
---------------------------------------------

¶22. (SBU) Given the volume of travel and trade between the United
States and Israel, it is not surprising that Israeli OC has also
gained a foothold in America. Over the last decade, media reports
have detailed a number of high-profile cases involving Israeli OC,
ranging from large-scale drug deals to murder. The ongoing Central
District of California grand jury investigation against the Abergil
family, where a RICO conspiracy case was initiated in December 2007,
best demonstrates the full extent of such criminal activity.
Investigators have linked Yitzhak Abergil and his entire network to
crimes of "embezzlement, extortion, kidnapping, and money
laundering." Yitzhak Abergil is currently under arrest in Israel
and facing extradition for related charges linking him to the murder
of Israeli drug dealer Samy Attias on U.S. soil.

¶23. (SBU) As part of an ongoing effort to track Israeli OC through
media reports and police sources, Post so far has identified 16
families and 78 related individuals who are at the center of Israeli
organized criminal activity. The consular section has revoked
several visas for those who have been convicted of crimes in Israel,
but many OC figures have no prior criminal convictions and carry no
visa ineligibilities. As a result, many hold valid nonimmigrant
visas to the United States and have traveled freely or attempted to
travel for a variety of purposes.

¶24. (SBU) In March 2009, Post received information from law
enforcement authorities that convicted criminal and member of the
Abergil organization, Mordechai Yair Hasin, along with his pregnant
wife and child, was intending to flee Israel for Los Angeles on
valid tourist visas. Hasin's visa was revoked based on his
conviction, as were his family's visas after they were determined to
be intending immigrants.

¶25. (SBU) As in the Hasin case, Post is using every available tool
to limit OC travel to the United States, but such efforts are not
always successful. In June 2008, Post issued Adam Abitbul a valid
tourist visa. Abitbul had no prior criminal convictions, and
carried no visa ineligibilities. Several months later, Post
received information from the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)
that he had traveled to the United States to carry out a hit.
Abitbul returned to Israel prematurely for his father's funeral, at
which time Post revoked his visa. (Post can only revoke the visas of
Israeli citizens while in country.) In a similar case, in October
2008 Post issued Moshe Bar Muha a tourist visa; he claimed to be
traveling for medical treatment. Post subsequently received
information from the LAPD that Bar Muha is in fact the brother of
Itzik Bar Muha of the Jerusalem Gang (see above) and a convicted
criminal.

¶26. (SBU) As recently as March 2009, Zvika Ben Shabat, Yaacov
Avitan, and Tzuri Rokah requested visas to attend a
"security-related convention" in Las Vegas. According to local
media reports, all three had involvement with OC. Post asked the
applicants to provide police reports for any criminal records in
Israel, but without such evidence there is no immediate
ineligibility for links to OC. Luckily, all three have so far
failed to return for continued adjudication of their applications.
Nevertheless, it is fair to assume that many known OC figures hold
valid tourist visas to the United States and travel freely.

Comment: Israeli OC Slipping Through the Consular Cracks
--------------------------------------------- ---------

¶27. (SBU) Given the growing reach and lethal methods of Israeli OC,
blocking the travel of known OC figures to the United States is a
matter of great concern to Post. Through collaboration with Israeli
and U.S. law enforcement authorities, Post has developed an
extensive database and placed lookouts for OC figures and their foot
soldiers. Nevertheless, the above visa cases demonstrate the
challenges that have arisen since the termination of the Visas Shark
in September 2008. Unlike OC groups from the former Soviet Union,
Italy, China, and Central America, application of INA
212(a)(3)(A)(ii) against Israeli OC is not specifically authorized
per Foreign Affairs Manual 40.31 N5.3. As such, Israelis who are
known to work for or belong to OC families are not automatically
ineligible for travel to the United States.

Cunningham

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/05/09TELAVIV1098.html
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wodan
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za 11 dec 2010, 01:44

[quote name="jasmin"]1. elk document wordt zorgvuldig gelezen voor eventuele publicatie
2. betrokken partijen wordt aangeboden mee te kijken, en eventueel suggesties voor redactie te geven
Het State Department van de VS heeft dat aanbod afgeslagen, en ook het aanbod tot minimalisering van schade...

Kennelijk was Israel slimmer, en heeft het aanbod wel aangenomen. Dit wordt niet direct gezegd, maar ik meende wel te begrijpen dat er gesprekken waren geweest met Israel, dat Assange de intelligentie opmerkte van Netanyahu.
Plus dat de kritieken terecht hebben opgemerkt dat er tot nu toe weinig direct belastend materiaal voor Israel is vrij gegeven.

Ik ga nog helemaal geen eindconclusies trekken. Gewoon informatie ordenen.
Bovenstaande bewijst totaal niet dat Assange een agent van Israel is. Anders waren er zowiezo geen gesprekken geweest, [/quote]
Aha, dus een deal met Israël sluiten. Als de VS er dus op in waren gegaan, had er helemaal geen informatie naar buiten hoeven komen? Zei ik eerder niet iets over 'slaatje eruit willen slaan'?

Het bewijst voor mij in ieder geval nog steeds niet dat Assange en Wikileaks oprecht te noemen zijn.

Daarnaast .. de gesprekken met Israël kunnen OOK gewoon opzet zijn, om dingen anders te laten lijken dan ze zijn. Ik weet het nog steeds niet hoor... ik moet er anders naar kijken dan ik doe, maar in alles wat er voorbij komt, word ik nog steeds niet overtuigd.
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jasmin
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za 11 dec 2010, 02:47

Visa en Mastercard

Eerst eens dingen op een rijtje zetten over het probleem met Visa en Mastercard.

Het irriteert me al heel lang dat deze kaarten je zo goed als opgedrongen worden als je via internet betalingen wilt doen. Tot ergernis van mijn kinderen, want een heleboel door hun gewenste transacties kunnen gewoon niet doorgaan. Mamma vertikt het om zo'n kaart aan te schaffen.

Het is echter de bedoeling dat dit dominante systeem als structureel betalingssysteem ingevoerd gaat worden. Volgens het eerder genoemde artikel in Trouw (1) is de Europese Unie bezig met het ontwikkelen van een nieuw systeem, dat de bestaande pinpassen gaat vervangen: de Single European Payment Area (Sepa).
De grote spelers zullen Mastercard en Visa worden.

Voor mij persoonlijk is het niet alleen het principe van monopolie dat ik afwijs. Ook het principe van creditcard (2). Het is het laagdrempelig maken van leningen met waanzinnig hoge woekerrentes (3). Precies het systeem waar we eigenlijk vanaf willen. Als je een betaling wilt doen met een creditcard sluit je dus een lening met het bedrijf/bank af, die je later terug gaat betalen.

Daarnaast wordt er zo enorm verdiend. De aanvrager moet jaarlijks onderhoudskosten betalen, betaalt forse rente over het bedrag dat uitstaat, maar ook de ontvanger moet een percentage van het transactiebedrag afstaan. Voor kleine ondernemers is het niet echt gunstig om creditcards te accepteren, want hun winstmarge staat toch al zo op scherp. Zij prefereren gewoon pinnen boven de creditcards., want voor pinnen staat een klein, vast bedrag per transactie, in plaats een percentage van het totale transactiebedrag. Bovendien wordt ook voor een simpele actie als geld pinnen bij de automaat fors verdient. In het voorbeeld van de VISA Greencard (4) (vond ik een komisch voorbeeld) betreft het 2% van het transactiebedrag, met een minimum van 4,95!!!

De monopolie positie van deze twee bedrijven is natuurlijk ook precair. De financiële wandelgangen van bedrijven, en individuen komen zo prachtig in kaart te liggen.
Het is inmiddels ook duidelijk dat de bedrijven eigen rechter spelen. In 2006 lieten ze bijvoorbeeld weten dat een Russisch muzieksite, AllofMP3.com, niet langer inkomsten via VISA of Mastercard kon ontvangen. Het bedrijf had een te lage verkoopsprijs voor hun producten. Visa liet weten dat de maatregel was genomen overeenkomstig wetgeving in Rusland en 'fundamentele internationale normen' op het gebied van copyrights en intellectueel eigendom. MasterCard zei niet toe te staan dat zijn netwerk werd gebruikt voor onwettige activiteiten. AllofMP3.com zei royalty's af te dragen aan een Russische auteursrechtenorganisatie en daarmee te voldoen aan de wettelijke vereisten in Rusland. De muziekindustrie stelde dat de Russische organisatie niet bevoegd was de royalty's te incasseren en te verdelen. (5)

Op dit moment bemoeit mijn bank zich nog niet met mijn geldstromen, maar het vooruitzicht naar de toekomst is niet rooskleurig. De organisaties die mogelijk straks mijn geldstromen faciliteren schijnen NU al het recht in eigen hand te kunnen nemen om transacties te weigeren, of tegoeden te bevriezen, op grond van eigen oordeel, en zonder tussenkomst van rechterlijke macht.

Wikileaks en Visa en Mastercard

In het document over Rusland (6) gaat het over de Russische wet die er zou komen waarin de komst van VISA en Mastercard ontmoedigd zou worden. De Russen wilden hun eigen systeem (NCPS) invoeren, en eventuele samenwerking met de genoemde bedrijven was wel mogelijk, maar onder ongunstige voorwaarden. Bovendien zou het wettelijk vastgelegd worden dat informatie over betalingen binnen Rusland niet naar Amerika mocht gaan.


6.(C) According to Vishnyakov, MinFin understands that this

MOSCOW 00000228 002 OF 002

would entail so much expense and difficulty for Visa and MasterCard that the two companies might quit the Russian domestic market. Vishnyakov believes that, at least at the Deputy Minister level, MinFin's hands are tied. Implying that Russian security services were behind this decision, Vishnyakov said, "There is some se-cret (government) order that no one has seen, but everyone has to abide by it." As described reftel, credit card company and bank representatives have told us that GOR officials apparently assume that US payment systems routinely share data associated with payment transactions by Russian cardholders with intelligence services in the US and elsewhere.


De conclusie van de Amerikanen was de volgende:

While the draft legislation has yet to be submitted to the Duma and can still be amended, post will continue to raise our concerns with senior GOR officials. We recommend that senior USG officials also take advantage of meetings with their Russian counterparts, including through the Bilateral Presidential Commission, to press the GOR to change the draft text to ensure U.S. payment companies are not adversely affected.



Het is duidelijk dat met een nieuw betalingssysteem in Europa, uitgevoerd door de Amerikaanse bedrijven VISA en Mastercard, een aantal zaken fundamenteel gaan wringen. De privacy van personen, de absolute afhankelijkheid van onze financiële zaken van twee Amerikaanse bedrijven, plus dat iedereen aan een soort geldinfuus wordt gekoppeld: onbeperkt toegang tot geld met woekerrentes…



(1) http://www.trouw.nl/nieuws/media-techno ... uropa.html
(2) http://www.creditcardvergelijking.nl/wa ... edit-card/
(3) http://www.moneymagazine.nl/creditcard/ ... DgodPAPJ0w
(4) http://www.creditcardvergelijking.nl/vi ... greencard/
(5) http://www.trouw.nl/nieuws/wereld/artic ... e_ban.html
(6) http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-emba ... CMP=twt_gu
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baphomet
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za 11 dec 2010, 02:59

Wow! Thanks Jasmin! Mooie aanvulling!

Nogmaals als je zelf stukjes / atikelen wilt publiceren, geef je wel een gil toch?
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combi
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za 11 dec 2010, 03:51

WikiLeaks-leider Julian Assange zal in de Verenigde Staten (VS) worden aangeklaagd voor spionage. De Amerikaanse openbaar aanklagers ronden momenteel het papierwerk af voor de zaak tegen de 39-jarige man.

Een van de advocaten van Assange, Jennifer Robinson, heeft dat vanmiddag gezegd in de Engelse krant de Daily Mail. Haar cliënt zit momenteel vast in Groot-Brittannië op verdenking van verkrachting van twee Zweedse vrouwen.

De geboren Australiër hangt een rechtszaak boven het hoofd voor het naar buiten brengen van meer dan 250.000 geheime diplomatieke stukken. Volgens Robinson zal vervolging waarschijnlijk plaatsvinden op basis van de Antispionagewet. Deze stelt dat het illegaal is om informatie over de staatsveiligheid te bemachtigen, als de ontvanger weet dat deze illegaal is verkregen.

De Amerikaanse regering heeft vandaag ontkend ondernemingen onder druk te hebben gezet om niet langer met WikiLeaks samen te werken. "Wij hebben niemand onder druk gezet om iets te doen", zei minister Eric Holder van Justitie. Er werd lange tijd gespeculeerd over druk op bedrijven als Visa, MasterCard en Amazon, die de samenwerking met WikiLeaks plotseling beëindigden.


http://www.powned.tv/nieuws/buitenland/ ... spion.html
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jasmin
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za 11 dec 2010, 04:51

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Tobi
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za 11 dec 2010, 04:53

[quote name="jasmin"]http://www.powned.tv/nieuws/tech/2010/1 ... ileak.html[/quote]
dat wou ik 40 minuten geleden ook posten.. maar wat combi hierboven heeft gepost is toch hetzelfde?
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